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Abstract. This article presents insights about Lithuania’s media elite, 
gained during research carried out on the basis of a complex Europeanness 
model, developed by Heinrich Best (Best 2012: 208-233). Data describing 
Lithuania’s media elite are analyzed with reference to three dimensions or 
facets, identified in the original model of Europeanness: emotive, cognitive-
evaluative and projective-conative. However, the list of variables examined 
in the study is considerably longer as compared to the initial static model 
offered by Best, and the analysis is much more detailed. This comparative 
study is aimed at identifying and describing the evolution of emotive identi-
fication of Lithuania’s media elite with Europe in terms of the objective and 
judging approach of the EU in the period from 2008 to 2015. Results of the 
1 The study was funded by the Research Council of Lithuania on the basis of agreement 
MIP-025/2015.
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research revealed a clear trend that Lithuania’s media elite have been be-
coming European. It was noticed that it tends to increasingly associate itself 
emotionally with Europe. Besides, the number of representatives of this elite 
group that assesses the common EU governance negatively (when the EU’s 
common foreign policy in respect of countries found beyond the EU borders 
is becoming increasingly accepted) has been consistently decreasing and the 
trust in the EU institutions has been enhancing. Looking to the future, the 
representatives of Lithuania’s media elite tend to assess the EU prospects in 
the medium-term and long-term (10 years) optimistically. They also hold 
the view that 10 years later the EU, as a geopolitical, political and economic 
entity will be stronger, and that both social and economic differences among 
the EU member states will not be so sharp. Euroscepticism is seen not only on 
the cultural plane. Correlation analysis has revealed that young age (people 
under 40) and an intensive socialization in the EU networks (constant com-
munication with the EU partners) determine that Lithuania’s media elite 
have been becoming European. 
Keywords: Europeanness, media elite, the European Union, the EU in-
stitutions, Lithuania, emotive or affective identity, assessment, EU’s common 
foreign policy, trust, future prospects of the EU. 
1. Introduction
This comparative study delves into the Europeanness of the Lithu-
anian mass media elite and its development in the period from 2008 to 
2015, which brought many changes both to Lithuania and to the Euro-
pean Union (EU). In 2008 and 2012, Lithuania saw the parliamentary 
elections, which demonstrated quite different results – the majority, 
composed of the central and right wing, elected in 2008, was replaced by 
the majority formed of the central and left wing, elected in 2012. Over 
the period under consideration, the Lithuanian national currency – 
 the Litas – was replaced with the euro (the first attempt in 2007 had 
failed, but the second one in 2015 was a success). In addition, the 2008-
2015 period is considered to be the time of the painful manifestation of 
an unprecedented financial crisis in Lithuania and the aversion of the 
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crisis by using drastic austerity measures as well as a period of abso-
lute economic recovery. Finally, the second half of 2013 is the period 
of Lithuania’s presidency of the EU Council, when our politicians and 
diplomats took responsibility for the coordination of supranational 
(European level) decision-making processes. 
In the period from 2008 to 2015, the EU itself also encountered 
a number of important events. At the end of 2009, the Lisbon Treaty 
came into force on the basis of which the European Parliament, which 
is elected directly by the EU citizens, acquired new powers in the pro-
cess of adoption of the EU legislative acts, in the process of  approval of 
the EU budget and in seeking for international accord; also, an initiative 
was developed by European citizens, which provided for the right of 
the citizens of the Member States to demand new EU legislative acts; 
besides, the positions of President of the European Council and High 
Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were established, 
a direct election of the President of the European Commission and the 
European Parliament was approved etc. The years 2009 and 2014 saw 
ordinary elections of the European Parliament (EP), following which 
the number of eurosceptics in the EP increased significantly in 2014. 
In the 2008-2015 period, political and economic tension in the EU was 
also incited and is still being incited by the Greece debt crisis, which re-
quires new euro stabilization measures and which causes distrust in the 
European monetary system. Russia’s aggression against Georgia and 
Ukraine recorded during the period under consideration forced the EU 
to impose economic sanctions on Russia. The almost uncontrollable 
flow of refugees from the Middle East to Europe, which started in 2014, 
has been dividing the EU and promoting it to talk about the inclusion 
of restrictions in the Schengen Agreement. The aforementioned events 
(in Lithuania and the EU) have affected the value-related attitudes of 
Lithuania’s media elite (just like other segments of the national elite) as 
well as their attitude towards the EU.
Why is the attitude of media elite and its development important? 
Discussions in the academic environment and among citizens result in 
JOURNALISM RESEARCH • Science journal (Communication and information) • 2016 Nr. 10
24
general agreement that media elite (persons who take managerial posi-
tions in national mass media entities, political and social commenta-
tors who reach a wide audience) possess significant influence on public 
opinion as well as on public policy. Some authorities of public com-
munication even state that media creates and shapes, instead of reflect-
ing and resonating to the mood and evaluation by the general public 
(McCombs, 2004). The impact of the media of the Central and East-
ern Europe on the processes taking place in the society reveals impor-
tant and long-term trends of public trust in media as an institution 
(Matonytė 2009: 172; Balčytienė, Vinciūnienė, Auškalnienė 2012) and 
the increasing convergence, homogenization and commercialization 
of media sources (Balčytienė, Bajomi-Lazar, Štětka, Sükösd, 2015). 
Besides, the emphasis is put on the power of the national media elite, 
which is extraordinarily big, particularly in Lithuania, in regard to other 
segments of social power elite (Matonytė 2010). Thus, these theoreti-
cal and empirical observations lead to the need to study the content, 
the outlines and the development of the Europeanness of media elite of 
new EU member states (in this case, of Lithuania’s) in more detail. This 
is evident especially in view of the fact that academic research show that 
the media outlets of the EU member states are one of the most impor-
tant factors that shape the political and cultural agenda of the EU and 
determine the occurrence of the European public space (Koopman, 
Statham, 2010). In this way, this study into trends of the Europeanness 
of Lithuania’s media leaders and their characteristics is interesting not 
only as a certain academic “exercise,” but also as a review of important 
factors, which may have a considerable effect on identity and policy, on 
levels both national and supranational.     
2. The Notion of Europeanness 
The concept of Europeanness, introduced by Heinrich Best (2012) 
and developed in empirical research carried out in Lithuania (Matonytė, 
Morkevičius 2013) accentuates that the EU, as a political project, as a 
setup of political institutions and as a political community, can be re-
25
JOURNALISM RESEARCH • Science journal (Communication and information) • 2016 Nr. 10
lated to different systems of attitudes (emotive, cognitive, evaluative), 
different orientation in terms of time (principles directed towards the 
past, perceptions of here and now, visions and expectations directed to-
ward the future) and different reference objects (EU institutions, strat-
egies, policy directions, values etc.). This multifaceted notion of Euro-
peanness is defined by identifying three dimensions: affective, cognitive-
evaluative, and projective (Matonytė; Morkevičius 2013: 73-75), which 
all help express the relation between the social actors (segments of elite, 
individual groups of societies etc.) and the EU. 
More specifically, the emotive aspect of Europeanness records peo-
ple’s identification with Europe and, correspondingly, it is thought 
that the stronger is the relation with Europe (or the EU), the higher 
is the level of Europeanness. One of the key academic tasks, which is 
determined by this affective aspect of European identity, is to evaluate 
and interpret the relationship between the national and supranational 
(European) identity (positive, negative or neutral). The cognitive-eval-
uative dimension of Europeanness reflects the interest of an individual 
person and of collectively operating social actors in the EU politics and 
relevant events and the normative assessment of these things (approval 
or disapproval of the observed or forecast trends of the EU political, 
social and cultural life). In this case, Europeanness is expressed in a pro-
European attitude and a positive evaluation of the EU institutions, their 
political direction and their support. This can be measured when, for 
instance, the level of trust in the EU institutions is known as well as 
the attitude towards the statement “the European unification has gone 
too far or should be reinforced,” etc.; also, the determination to direct 
important and authoritative decisions from the national level to the su-
pranational level, positive assessment of efficiency of the EU decisions 
etc. In this regard, Euroscepticism is, accordingly, a reverse –  negative – 
form  of expression of the cognitive-evaluative Europeanness (Ondruz-
Băcescu 2014). 
The projective dimension of Europeanness reveals positive expecta-
tions related to the successful future of the EU (for example, in the next 
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10 years). Empirical data of this dimension includes beliefs about the 
EU prospects in the future, an acceptance of further common policy of 
the EU etc. 
3. Description of Empirical Research
This study refers to the details on Lithuania’s media elite collected 
in the period from November-December 2008 to October-November 
2015. In the survey, which was prepared according to the international 
comparative (of countries and elite segments) methodology, respond-
ents were asked to answer questions related to the national government 
and the EU (Best, Lengyel, Verzichelli 2012; Matonytė, Morkevičius 
2013). 
In 2008, as many as 35 representatives of the media elite in Lithu-
ania (just like in other European countries in which this scientific pro-
ject was carried out) were interviewed. The sample included editors 
and deputies of national dailies, weeklies, commercial and public televi-
sion and radio channels, portals of online news, heads of news agencies 
and the most prominent journalists and political commentators of the 
country, the content created and disseminated by whom is first of all 
(and in principle) not of the entertaining, but of informational (politi-
cal and public) character (for more, see Matonytė, Morkevičius 2013: 
240-241). In 2015, by use of the analogous selection method and the 
same but updated questionnaire, as many as 32 representatives of Lith-
uania’s media elite were interviewed (the methodology of the survey 
established the quota of 30 respondents). 
In 2015, the total “population” of Lithuania’s media elite was com-
prised of 134 leaders of the country’s media. This list was compiled 
with reference to the positional institutional method and the method 
of elite selection based on reputation, i.e., taking into consideration the 
position held in significant means of mass media on a national scale 
and the prominence of the person in the society (expert evaluation was 
supplemented in autumn 2015, when one informational online portal 
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announced a list of the most influential leaders of Lithuania’s media 
( Jackevičius 2015). Following the principle of rating (in descending 
order), 72 persons on the list were contacted (almost every second on 
the list), i.e., 35 of them who completed the questionnaire drawn up 
for the survey. To contact the respondents, publicly available contact 
details were used and (in some cases) personal relations (contacts on 
Facebook). Emails, which contained the description of the survey, were 
sent to them and they were invited to join the implementation of the 
survey by responding to questions (an electronic form of the question-
naire was also available, respondents could also answer the questions 
during a face-to-face meeting with the surveyor or a telephone survey 
method could be used). Every potential respondent received the invita-
tion twice. 
It should be noted that in the reference period, i.e., from 2008 to 
2015, the sector of Lithuania’s media encountered no radical struc-
tural changes (no new players entered the media market). Neverthe-
less, there were some organizational changes: during the reference 
period, the internet media became considerably more important in 
Lithuania – it now bows down only to television in terms of popu-
larity, whereas hardcopy newspapers and magazines have been in-
creasingly losing their audience (the European Parliament Informa-
tion Office in Lithuania 2015). However, despite the increasingly 
popular internet news portals, the public trust in media is not even-
ly distributed: in 2008, those who trusted it accounted for 41.5% 
(details by portals BNS and Lrytas.lt 2008), in 2013, this indicator 
was at a record low – 33% (details by online dailies BNS and Lrytas.
lt 2013), and in 2015, this rate increased again and amounted to 40% 
(Lietuvos Rytas 2015). Over the period under consideration, Lithua-
nia (due to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine) saw the emergence of new 
information about the influence of propaganda: announcements that 
disclosed manipulations in a public sphere were made public (Delfi 
2015), amendments to the Law on Public Information were discussed 
(and adopted) (ELTA, 2015), also, the retransmission of some foreign 
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TV channels recognized as propaganda was temporarily suspended in 
Lithuania (Zubrutė 2015).
The comparison of Lithuania’s media elite in 2008 and 2015 as the 
main set and the list of relevant samples leads to the statement that, 
in the first case, almost 60%, and in the second case – almost 50% of 
respondents coincided (in other words, in 2015, every second respond-
ent completed an analogous questionnaire in 2008), which shows the 
stability of Lithuania’s media elite as a collective entity.2 
Although it is known that representatives of media elite often take 
few positions – for instance, the same person is an editor of a media 
source, the head of a news agency and an influential commentator or 
blogger – in general, the structural profile of Lithuania’s media, when 
comparing the year 2008 and the year 2015, is fairly similar (see Table 
No. 1). Given the represented means of mass media, both in 2008 and 
2015, most of the respondents belonged to internet media. The abso-
lute majority of the respondents belonged to the same media sector in 
both periods of the survey and, according with the position they held, 
they were either the managers (CEOs, editors, owners) or leading jour-
nalists (observers, analysts, commentators, public intellectuals). 
From the social-demographic point of view, both samples of the 
media elite were similar: the average age in 2008 was 43 years old, in 
2015 – 44 years old. In 2008, the number of male respondents was 
higher (77%), and in 2015, the sample of respondents demonstrated 
more even distribution of male and female respondents (59% of men 
and 41% of women). With respect to whether respondents affiliated 
themselves to the Roman Catholic confession, which is prevailing in 
Lithuania, in 2008, such persons accounted for the absolute majority of 
Roman Catholics, meanwhile, in 2015, their number slightly reduced. 
2 In simple terms, it would be interesting to have an analysis of the possible develo-
pment (change) of the attitude of certain individuals who participated in the survey in 
2008 and 2015; however, following the principles of confidentiality of survey details 
and data protection, it is technically impossible.
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Table No. 1. The structural profile of the representatives of Lithuania’s media elite, 
interviewed in 2008 and 2015.
Characteristics
Mass media in 
2008
Mass media in 
2015
% N % N
Age:
under 40 46 16 50 16
40 and over 54 19 50 16
Means of mass media:
Television 17 6 13 4
Radio 11 4 13 4
Daily (press) 11 4 9 3
Weekly (press) 17 6 19 6
Internet media 27 9 37 12
Media agency - - 6 2
other 17 6 3 1
Position occupied:
Manager (head), deputy, 
executive director, owner 48 17 34 11
Editor 6 2 13 4
Journalist 46 16 53 17
Interestingly, the intentions of the leaders of Lithuania’s media in-
terviewed in the 2008-2015 surveys to pursue a professional career on 
the European level became more evident (from 26% to 31%). Even the 
sample of 2015 already contained some cases of repatriation – for in-
stance, there was a respondent who said that he managed to attain a 
career on the European level and returned to Lithuania to continue it; 
meanwhile, the long list of our survey, which includes a set of Lithu-
ania’s media elite, contained some more similar cases. 
In the period from 2008 to 2015, the number of representatives of 
Lithuania’s media elite, who do not communicate with the heads or col-
leagues from the EU institutions or organizations at all or communicate 
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very little (merely once in 3 months) in their professional activities, had 
decreased (see Chart No. 1). Whereas in 2008, the leaders of Lithu-
anian media, who engaged in the European network, little accounted 
for 40%, but in 2015, they accounted for only 25%. The proportion of 
those who communicated with their colleagues in the EU intensively 
(at least once a month) significantly increased: from 38% in 2008 to 
56% in 2015.  
With regard to the aforementioned distinctive distribution of power 
in Lithuania (Matonytė 2009), it should be noted that in 2015, Lith-
uania’s media elite stressed the role of the EU institutions in the na-
tional decision-making system: their (EU institutions’) influence on 
the changes encountered in the country was seen by the respondents 
as “very big” and equal to the authority of business organizations and 
the President of the Republic (Dalia Grybauskaitė). With a view to the 
changes in the national decision-making system and the field of culture 
in 2008-2015 (i.e., when Lithuania positioned itself as an EU Member 
State more effectively), the focus on an ordinary citizen decreased in 
the reference period and the influence of the MPs of the EP decreased 
as well (see Chart No. 2). In addition, it is important to note that the 
Chart No. 1. The professional contact of the representatives of Lithuania’s media 
elite in the EU in 2008 and 2015.
How often have you contacted people from the EU institutions  
or organisations and companies operating in the EU in your professional 
activities over the last 12 months?
At least once a month At least once a week
Mass media in  
2015 (N = 32)
Mass media in  
2008 (N = 32)
21.9%37.5%
18.8%56.3%
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leaders of media started evaluating their (representatives of the most 
important means of mass media) influence on the national decision-
making process in a more reserved manner, though they remained 
highly ranked: when comparing the year 2008 and 2015, it can be seen 
that in 2008, the influence of an MP of the Seimas was evaluated as 
30% more significant than that of a media leader (i.e., 61 and 41 points 
accordingly were given on a 100-point scale); meanwhile, in 2015, it 
was seen as almost twice bigger than that of a media leader (51 and 
28 points; see Chart No. 2). 
Chart No. 2. The 2008 and 2015 opinions of the representatives of Lithuania’s media 
elite on power distribution.
Influence of persons representing individual institutions  
in resolving issues important to Lithuania:
(the average is presented on a 100-point scale:  
0 – has no influence, 100 – has a considerable influence
Ordinary citizen
Parliament (Seimas) Member with 
experience in the Government or an 
important Seimas Committee
                  Member of the European 
Parliament
Representative of the most important 
means of mass media
Average 2015 (N = 32)Average 2008 (N = 31)
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4. Emotive Europeanness
As regards the emotive level, i.e., the perception of one’s identity, it 
has been observed that in the period from 2008 to 2015, the share of 
Lithuania’s media elite, which associated itself firmly both with Lithu-
ania and Europe, had maximally increased (see Chart No. 3). The Eu-
ropean identity, which has developed in an affective manner, can be 
explained as a consequence of the increasing experience of Lithuania’s 
membership in the EU (the duration of socialization in Europe). For 
example, when comparing the old and the new EU member states, it 
can be observed that the identity in the old EU member states (from all 
viewpoints of the society) was considerably more developed; this fact 
can be explained by the particular “mechanical” variable of the duration 
of membership in the EU (Mansfeldova; Spicarova, Staskova 2009). 
Academic literature fails to substantiate that EU membership could 
directly and exclusively shape national identity. As stated and asserted 
Chart No. 3. The identification of Lithuania’s mass media with Lithuania and with 
Europe (EU) in 2008 and in 2015. 
*Exact question in 2008: Do you affiliate yourself with Europe?
Lithuania
2008 (N = 35)
Lithuania
2015 (N = 32)
Do you affiliate yourself with ... (%)
Strongly 
affiliate
Vaguely 
affiliate
Europe
2008 (N = 35)
Europe
2015 (N = 32)
74.3%
96.9%
40.0%
62.5%
22.9%
3.1%
51.4%
31.3%
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in the classical academic theory of different level of identities, the situ-
ation is different: the developed (developing) European identity nega-
tively affects the identification with a nation (and local community) and 
vice versa – the fear to lose national identity weakens the support to the 
EU (McLaren 2004). However, the other camp of academic research 
reveals the “marble cake” trend when analyzing the subject of identity 
(Hermann, Risse-Kappen, Brewer 2004), which entails the European 
and the national identity supporting each other rather than acting as 
opposites. The latter theory is also evidenced by the details about the 
European and the national identity of Lithuania’s media elite: both have 
been developing in a coherent manner. In 2015, Lithuania’s media elite 
(the sample of which included Poles, Russians and Jews) associated 
themselves with Lithuania and Europe in a parallel manner. This phe-
nomenon of double identification is first of all explained as a response 
to the events in Ukraine, which is strongly supported by Lithuania as 
fighting for its European prospect and national sovereignty. 
The trend of identification with Lithuania (from the affective as-
pect), which is prompted by external factors (threat and opportunities) 
is contributed to by the observation that Lithuania’s media elite assess 
Lithuania’s democracy, quality of performance of the state institutions 
and the well-being of citizens critically, and this, in turn, shows no as-
sociations with deep feelings towards one’s country – Lithuania – at all 
(see Section 5.3). In this context, the EU is itself one of the external fac-
tors (defined relatively in separation from the national political frame-
work), which determines positive context and offers prospects. 
5. Cognitive-Evaluative Europeanness 
5.1. Further Support to European Integration 
From the cognitive-evaluative point of view, in the period from 
2008 to 2015, Lithuania’s media elite demonstrated its Europeanness 
only fractionally. The direction of the change based on rational consid-
erations and evaluations was completely different (decreased) from the 
aforementioned any more pronounced emotional identification with 
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Europe. Although the absolute majority of Lithuania’s media elite sup-
pose that the European unification should be promoted and supported, 
the support (having in mind further prospects of this idea) by the rep-
resentatives of mass media decreased in 2015, but still remained quite 
strong: from 7.0 to 6.8 points. The support of a unified Europe in the fu-
ture was assessed on the 10-point scale, where 0 meant that the process 
has already exceeded the limits, and 10 ‒ that it should be more active. 
Still, it should be noted that in 2015, the variety of opinions of Lithu-
ania’s media elite on this issue was wider (in 2008, the standard devia-
tion was 2.2, and in 2015 – 2.5 points). There were one or two leaders 
of Lithuania’s media claiming that the EU integration has exceeded all 
limits. This could be seen as an expression of Euroscepticism.
As seen from the verbal commentaries of the respondents, this 
change in the idea of European unification (its weakening trend) can 
be based on economic reasons: the problem of Greece’s debts, which 
became relevant from 2009, unveiled the drawbacks of the European 
monetary system. However, this eurosceptical “revelation,” with respect 
to Lithuania’s media elite, is very narrow, since, in parallel, it was record-
ed that the fact that Lithuania (eventually) joined the Eurozone, which, 
as is known, has currently been burdened by many problems and the 
uncertainty of which was assessed positively. 
5.2. Influence of the EU Member States on the EU Governance
In general, Lithuania’s media elite were quite undivided both in 
2008 and in 2015 in its attitude that some (big) countries are too influ-
ential in the supranational EU decision-making system. Still, the num-
ber of those who think differently increased over the reference period 
(from 6% in 2008 to 16% in 2015 (see Chart No. 4). An even more pro-
nounced trend from the cognitive-evaluative attitude towards Europe-
anness was noticed when comparing the opinions of Lithuania’s media 
elite in 2008 and 2015 on whether consideration is taken of Lithuania’s 
interests when making decisions in the EU supranational or inter-gov-
ernmental structures: the number of those who think that the EU level 
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decision-makers fail to take into consideration Lithuania’s interests suf-
ficiently fell notably (from 43% to 31%, see Chart No. 4). 
The evaluation by Lithuania’s media elite of whether Lithuania 
benefited from being a member state of the EU did not change and 
remained maximally high (positive). In 2015, in particular, there were 
none of those left who had doubts about the benefits of being in the EU 
among the representatives of Lithuania’s media elite. This trend could 
be explained not only by direct benefits obtained by Lithuania while us-
ing the finances of the EU Structural Funds and other sources related to 
the EU and availing of the provided opportunities, but also indirectly, 
especially, in the context of the war in Ukraine, when considering a pos-
sible scenario of  could have happened had Lithuania not been in the 
EU composition. 
5.3. Trust in Institutions
As regards the attitude of Lithuania’s media elite towards the politi-
cal authority institutions, in 2015, a slight, but still lower distrust in the 
Chart No. 4. The opinion of Lithuania’s media elite about governance in the EU.
Agree  2008 (N = 35) Agree  2015 (N = 32)
Opinion of Lithuania’s Media Elite About the EU Governance
Certain countries’ interests 
have too much weight 
in the EU
Those who make decisions on the EU 
level, do not take sufficient 
consideration of Lithuania’s interests
94.3%
84.4%
42.9%
31.3%
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Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania could be felt (on a 10-point scale, 
the assessment equal to 4.0 in 2008 dropped to 4.6 in 2015 on aver-
age). With a view of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, in 
2015, trust in this body remained minimal (slightly higher than in the 
Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania) but stable (5.1 point in 2008 and 
in 2015).
In the context of such low trust in political institutions, trust of the 
representatives of Lithuania’s media elite in the EU institutions ac-
quired additional tones of the value. First, change (differences) in the 
trust expressed by Lithuania’s media elite in the EU institutions could 
be observed over the period from 2008 to 2015. Second, when compar-
ing the level of trust in national and supranational political institutions, 
a trend to “credit” the European institutions more than the Lithuanian 
ones could be observed. 
Although the number of those who trusted (chosen by 8-10 people 
on the scale from 1 to 10) in the European Parliament dropped dra-
matically (from 20% in 2008 to 12.5% in 2015), there were also less 
of those who had almost no trust in this institution (1-4, from 31.4% 
to 28.1%). Still, in general, the average rate of trust in the EP did not 
change: both in 2008 and in 2015, it was 5.5, i.e., 1 point higher than the 
rate of trust in the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. 
As regards trust in the European Commission, the situation was 
similar. The number of respondents who did not trust in this institu-
tion (1-4) increased (from 14.3% in 2008 to 18.8% in 2015); however, 
the number of those who highly trusted in the European Commission 
(8-10) increased (from 28.6% to 34.4%). Yet, the average rate of trust 
in the European Commission by Lithuania’s media elite was fairly stable 
over the period from 2008 to 2015 (6.1-6.2 points); on the one hand, it 
was slightly higher than trust in the European Parliament, on the other 
hand, it was one point higher than the rate of trust in the Government 
of the Republic of Lithuania.
The most marked change in the 2008-2015 period was observed 
when analyzing the trust of Lithuania’s media elite in the European 
37
JOURNALISM RESEARCH • Science journal (Communication and information) • 2016 Nr. 10
Council of Ministers. The number of the representatives of Lithuania’s 
media elite who trusted in this institution very much (8-10) increased 
dramatically (from 22.9% in 2008 to 40.6% in 2015), and the number 
of those who almost did not trust in it (1-4) dropped (from 20% to 
15.6%). The average rate of trust in this intergovernmental organization 
became considerably higher (from 5.8 points in 2008 to 6.5  points in 
2015). 
A relatively high level (increases or at least does not drop) of trust in 
the EU political institutions can be explained by the fact that the latter 
has become more known. On the one hand, Lithuania’s integration in 
the EU makes assumptions for direct engagement in the operation of 
the EU institutions and learning about their work more closely; on the 
other hand, in the second quarter of 2013, when Lithuania presided 
over the EU Council, more attention was devoted to the activities of the 
EU institutions. Here, the initiative and responsibility is borne by the 
media elite, who directly regulated and continue to regulate the flow of 
this information and the moulding of its content in Lithuania. 
5.4. Performance of Democracy in the EU
From the cognitive-evaluative viewpoint, in the period from 2008 
to 2015, representatives of Lithuania’s media elite were content with 
democracy in the EU (high rating). In 2015, the share of those who 
thought so increased up to 90%, and the portion of eurosceptics, who 
were discontent with democracy in the EU and had their reproaches 
with regard to the bureaucracy or poor relationship with population, 
decreased almost twice (see Chart No. 5). 
Thus, differently from the EP election in 2015, where the wave of 
Euroscepticism rose among the ordinary population (voters),3 leaders 
of the Lithuanian media were not so much Eurosceptical (in some 
aspects the decreasing trend was observed). The increased content 
3 It was also observed in Lithuania, when 3 out of 11 EP members referred to the state-
ments by Eurosceptics in their election campaigns and  belonged to the most Euro-
sceptic groups of EP parties (Matonytė, 2015).
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of the leaders of Lithuania’s media with democracy in the EU can be 
explained by two arguments: by directly observing and enlightening 
about the relevant events in the EU (due to Lithuania’s integration in 
the EU), they gain more good practice and accept the principles of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which came into force late 2009 and which guarantees 
greater democracy in the EP elections as well as when appointing the 
European Commission (see Section 5.5).
5.5. EU Governance
As regards the model of the EU governance, i.e., giving preference 
to intergovernmental and supranational (federal) principles of govern-
ance, in 2008, the absolute majority of Lithuania’s media elite tended 
to privilege the intergovernmental model of governance and to give 
prominence to the national interest (see Chart No. 6), i.e., it was almost 
unanimously stated that the member states, and not the central EU gov-
ernment, must be the main actors in the EU. Besides, more than a half 
Chart No. 5. The attitude of Lithuania’s media elite regarding democracy  
in the EU in 2008 and 2015. 
90.6%
Content
Are you content with the way democracy operates in the EU? (%)
82.9%
Mass media in  2008 (N = 35) Mass media in  2015 (N = 32)
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of the leaders of Lithuanian mass media were inclined to disapprove of 
the statement that the European Commission should become the ac-
tual government of the EU. 
It has been observed that the opinion of Lithuania’s media elite, in-
terviewed in 2015, about the EU governance referred less to the priori-
ties of the national government, but the trend to accept the intergovern-
mental model of governance was still clearly pronounced. The extent 
of acceptance of the statement that Member States and not the central 
EU government should be the main actors in the EU decreased by 20 
percentage points. The idea that the European Commission should be-
come the actual government of the EU received almost twofold support 
(more than 50% of respondents agreed with the idea). The attitude of 
the Lithuanian mass media leaders towards the strengthening of pow-
ers of the European Parliament almost did not change over the period 
from 2008 to 2015 and was favorable in this regard – in particular when 
this idea was advocated during the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty and 
later, when it was already established. 
Chart No. 6. The 2008 and 2015 opinions of the representatives of Lithuania’s media 
elite regarding EU governance.
Agree  2008 (N = 35) Agree  2015 (N = 32)
Do you agree with the statements below:   (%)
Member States and not the 
central EU Government should 
remain the main actors in the EU 
The European Commission 
should become the actual EU 
government
Powers of the European 
Parliament should be 
strenghtened
59.4% 56.3%
75.0%
62.9%
34.3%
97.1%
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5.6. Threats to the EU 
In cognitive-evaluative respect, it is important to analyze the evalu-
ation of threats to the EU. Such evaluation is inseparable from certain 
emotional tints and expresses the attitude toward the EU situation and 
development. A quite high level of perception of a specific threat shows 
that this specific aspect is considered important and problematic. 
This methodological observation is perfectly illustrated by the previ-
ously observed trend that representatives of Lithuania’s elite treat the 
threat posed by Russia to the unity of the EU as an especially great one 
(Matonytė, Morkevičius 2013).
The opinions of Lithuania’s media elite about the threats to the EU 
in the 2008-2015 period were dynamic; besides – most interestingly – 
trends both in descending and ascending directions were recorded (see 
Chart No. 7). In 2015, the attitude of Lithuania’s media elite towards 
Russia as a threat to Europe became clear to the maximum extent (from 
86% to 97%). 
When interviewed in 2008, Lithuania’s media elite pointed out that 
one of the most serious threats was the inclination of the EU member 
Chart No. 7. The 2008 and 2015 opinions of Lithuania’s media elite about the threat 
posed for the EU.
Do you think that the below listed things pose threat to the EU / pose no threat to the EU?  (%)
EU’s enlargement by 
accepting Turkey
Poses a great or quite great threat   2008 (N = 35)
Determination of 
Member States to defend 
and follow the national 
interests first
Economic differences 
among the Member 
States
Russia’s intereference 
in European affairs
Poses a great or quite great threat 2015 (N = 32)
51.4% 51.4%
34.3%
85.7%
28.1%
65.6%
53.1%
96.9%
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states to take into consideration their national interests in the first place. 
As seen before (see Section 5.5), Lithuania’s media elite agreed with 
the idea that member states should be the most important in the EU 
slightly less over the period from 2008 to 2015; for this reason, it seems 
consistent that in 2015, Lithuania’s media elite gave even more promi-
nence to the threat presented by the determination of the EU member 
states to defend their national interests first (from 51% to 66%). In par-
allel, the leaders of Lithuania’s media elite held the view that economic 
differences between the member states posed a threat to the EU. These 
changes could be explained as a response to the financial crisis of 2009 
(and the never-ending Greece’s debt repayment drama). This reaction 
also reveals the movement toward becoming European (i.e., determines 
the need to reduce economic differences among the EU member states 
and the importance of national interests in the EU system). 
On the other hand, in 2015, the leaders of Lithuania’s media elite 
were concerned about the threat posed by the possible accession of 
Turkey considerably less than in 2008. In the context of general per-
ception of geopolitical, political and economic threat to the EU, the 
reduced concern about such a threat as Turkey could be explained by 
the fact that with the danger of terrorism growing globally and with the 
increase of political (military) tension between Turkey and Russia, Tur-
key started to be perceived not as a “threat,” but as an “opportunity” for 
the EU (and Lithuania) both in terms of geopolitical and other aspects. 
This coordination of the attitude towards threats would mean that Lith-
uania’s media elite are inclined to think not only about Lithuania’s as of 
a separate state’s security and well-being, but also about the EU (Lithu-
ania’s situation in the European Union). The conducted analysis of the 
situation proves that it is typical for Lithuania’s media elite to behave ac-
cording with the “marble cake” principle, and this trend, in turn, deter-
mines the insights about the interaction of national and supranational 
combinations and landmarks.
The attitude towards the threats which are possibly posed to Lithu-
ania due to its membership in the EU brings forward another complete-
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ly different (opposite) aspect of the cognitive-evaluative Europeanness 
(the other side of the coin). The opposite of low and insensitive assess-
ment of different threats to the EU as an entity, which would mean the 
trend of becoming European is the threats, which are given high points 
and are sensitively assessed and posed to Lithuania due to its member-
ship in the European Union and which thus show weakening European-
ness; it is also called Euroscepticism.  
Over the period from 2008 to 2015, the concern of Lithuania’s me-
dia elite over the threats posed to Lithuania, which are related to its 
membership in the EU, became more serious. Only 3% of respondents 
interviewed in 2008 claimed that the EU policy presented a threat to 
Lithuania’s cultural integrity, and this number grew to 19% in 2015 (see 
Chart No. 8). Thus, a handful of individual eurosceptics, in terms of 
culture in 2008, increased to 20% in 2015 as regards Lithuania’s media 
elite. 
The opposite trend of weakening Euroscepticism is observed when 
talking about the threat posed to Lithuania’s social wellbeing by the 
EU policy. The number of the representatives of Lithuania’s media 
Chart No. 8. The 2008 and 2015 opinions of Lithuania’s Media Elite on the EU’s  
threat to Lithuania’s cultural integrity.
EU Policy Poses Threat to Lithuania’s Cultural Integrity  (%)
I completely (or more or less 
agree
I absolutely disagree
2.9%
60.0%
18.8%
37.1%
28.1%
53.1%
Mass media in  2008 (N = 35) Mass media in  2015 (N = 32)
I don’t quite agree
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elite thinking that there is no such threat at all increased by 15% and 
this happened at the expense of those who stuck to the “lukewarm” 
attitude in 2008 towards the possibly negative EU’s effect on the social 
wellbeing of Lithuania, but later changed their mind (see Chart No. 
9). As regards the threat of membership in the EU to the quality of 
democracy in Lithuania and Lithuania’s economic growth, Lithuania’s 
media elite, surveyed in 2015, was unanimous and did not observe any 
threat regarding this notion.
6. Projective Europeanness: EU 10 Years Later
From the projective point of view, i.e., looking at the approval (and 
disapproval) of the supranational level governance 10 years later, the 
outlines and the level of the Europeanness of Lithuania’s media elite 
over the period under consideration (2008-2015) slightly changed (see 
Chart No. 10). Whereas in 2008, when the idea and the need to provide 
greater support to the EU regions facing economic and social difficul-
Chart No. 9. The 2008 and 2015 opinions of Lithuania’s media elite about the EU’s 
threat to social well-being in Lithuania.
Mass media in  2008 (N = 35) Mass media in  2015 (N = 32)
EU Policy Poses Threat to Social Well-being in Lithuania (%)
I completely (or more or 
less) agree
I don’t quite agree I absolutely disagree
2.9%
40.0%
57.1%
3.1%
22.9%
71.9%
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ties received the highest degree of approval (90%), in 2015, the same 
degree of approval was expressed in terms of the EU’s common foreign 
policy vis-a-vis non-EU members states (increased by 10%).
Assuming that the most important component in the common 
policy of EU’s spheres is possibly the component of foreign policy, 
which is related to the development of national and supranational 
sovereignty (see Matonytė, Morkevičius 2013: 74-84), the available 
details about the fact that the support of the EU’s common foreign policy 
increased by 10% leads to a general statement that from the projective 
perspective, Lithuania’s mass media has been becoming European. This 
can be explained by the attractiveness of the EU’s pooled sovereignty, 
which has become prominent, especially in the face of geopolitical 
tension (due to upheaval in Ukraine and the threat posed by Russia). In 
part, it could be stated that the projective Europeanness of Lithuania’s 
media elite in the same (strengthening) direction was affected by the 
economic crisis, the control of which requires the provision of greater 
EU’s support to regions. Still, there is no reason to claim that economic 
motives would strongly promote Lithuania’s media elite to become 
Chart No. 10. The 2008 and 2015 opinions of Lithuania’s media elite about EU 
governance 10 years later. 
Agree  2008 (N = 35) Agree  2015 (N = 31)
When you think about the EU 10 years later, do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (%)
Single tax 
framework 
in the EU
Common social 
security system
EU’s common foreign 
policy with regard to 
all states beyond the 
EU borders
Greater support to 
those EU regions 
which face economic 
or social difficulties
54.3% 54.8%
62.6%
90.3% 94.3% 90.3%
53.3%
80.0%
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European in terms of projective dimension. Lithuania’s media elite only 
moderately favorably assessed the common EU tax and social security 
system over the reference period: both in 2008 and 2015, almost more 
than a half of leaders of Lithuania’s media elite agreed with these ideas 
of commonness; however, the number of those who disagreed with 
the idea to have the EU’s common social security system in 10 years 
evidently increased (the degree of approval dropped by 10%). 
Looking from the perspective of long-term visions, the attitude of 
Lithuania’s media elite towards the EU in the future is optimistic (see 
Chart No. 11). Two thirds of the leaders of Lithuanian mass media con-
sider that 10 years later the EU will be politically more integrated, its 
economy will be probably stronger, economic and social differences 
among the EU members states and their citizens will not be so much 
pronounced and the EU, as a geopolitical power, will become more im-
portant on a global scale. 
Based on these five criteria (increasing political integration, grow-
ing economy, indistinct social differences, smaller economic gap and 
Chart No. 11. The 2015 opinions of the representatives of Lithuania’s media elite 
about the future of the EU.  
Attitude Towards the Future of the EU 
2015 (N = 32)
Attitude of Media Elite Towards the Future of the EU
Optimistic
Pesimistic
Neutral (without 
any changes)
63.1%
16.3%
20.6%
JOURNALISM RESEARCH • Science journal (Communication and information) • 2016 Nr. 10
46
greater geopolitical power), a general statement could be made that the 
EU’s future is seen negatively by about 16% of the representatives of 
Lithuania’s media elite. Taken in isolation, the most pessimistic opinion 
held by Lithuania’s media elite was of the prospects of the EU as a geo-
political power (the number of pessimists (eurosceptics) accounts for 
30%). Lithuania’s media elite were least sceptical about the promising 
forecast with regard to economic development of the EU (hardly 5%).
7. Factors of Becoming European: Young Age and Socialization 
in the EU’s Networks
The analysis of details available on the period from 2008 to 2015 
about Lithuania’s media elite revealed that this segment of the elite, hav-
ing in mind the trends of becoming European, is quite united both on 
the emotive (affective), cognitive-evaluative and projective levels. Still, 
even relatively small samples (N 35 and 32) illustrate two catalysts of 
Europeanness. First, younger leaders (under 40) distinguish themselves 
from Lithuania’s media elite for their Europeanness. Over the period 
under observation, their emotive identification with Europe became 
especially evident (increased by 6%). From the cognitive-evaluative 
perspective, younger representatives of media elite are more support-
ive of the ideas of the EU’s unification and supranational governance. 
For instance, the idea that the European Commission should become 
the actual government of the EU both in 2008 and in 2015 was more 
supported (by 20%) by the leaders of mass media of younger age, the 
absolute majority of whom (68.8 %) expressed this opinion in 2015. 
If compared, it would become evident that this idea of making the EU 
more prominent is accepted by only every second leader of mass media, 
who is aged 40 or over 40. An even greater difference, while comparing 
the representatives of media elite of younger and older age, is demon-
strated by their attitude towards the issue whether the EU policy poses 
a threat to social wellbeing in Lithuania. For instance, “I don’t quite 
agree/I completely disagree” was the answer of almost every respond-
ent aged under 40 (93.8%); meanwhile, this opinion was expressed by 
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only every second respondent aged over 40. The leaders of mass media 
aged less than 40 were more enthusiastic when talking about becoming 
European, i.e., they assessed the future prospects of the EU optimisti-
cally.   
Analogous trends were observed looking at which of the representa-
tives of Lithuania’s media elite identified persons who communicate 
(keep contacts) intensively with the EU institutions and colleagues ver-
sus those who communicated with them only seldom or did not com-
municate at all. Those leaders of Lithuania’s mass media who were more 
engaged in the EU networks were more tied to the EU and, in view of 
both cognitive-evaluative and projective approaches, were more Euro-
pean.
8. Conclusions and Prospects of Research 
Assessing the changes that took place in the period from 2008 to 
2015 in observation of Lithuania’s media elite, an evident trend of be-
coming European was noticed. This is seen from all three dimensions, 
namely the affective, cognitive-evaluative and projective, which were 
taken into consideration when making the assessment. 
From the emotive perspective, the trend of Lithuania’s media elite 
becoming European is seen from the fact that it tends to relate itself 
not only with Lithuania, but also with Europe. Cognitive-evaluative Eu-
ropeanness becomes clear when comparing the elite’s attitude towards 
individual EU institutions, the general EU governance and satisfaction 
with democracy in the EU. Over the period under consideration, more 
trust was placed in certain EU institutions (in particular, the EU Coun-
cil); trust in the European Commission also increased (most represent-
atives of the elite would even give the European Commission the role of 
the EU government), and the general level of trust in political authority 
institutions in the EU is greater than in political bodies in Lithuania. 
Given the EU governance, the share of representatives of elite which 
negatively assess decision-making on the EU level decreased. The num-
ber of those who think that when making decisions the interests of cer-
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tain countries are overly-weighted had decreased; besides, there were 
also less of those who believed that, when making decisions in the EU, 
the interests of Lithuania were not taken into consideration enough. 
Besides, when assessing the quality of democracy in the EU, there were 
almost none among the leaders of Lithuanian mass media who would 
pronounce adversely about democracy in the EU.  
The analysis of the notion of a threat posed to Lithuania and the EU 
showed only a slight increase in cultural Euroscepticism among the rep-
resentatives of Lithuania’s media elite. With reference to other aspects 
of this parameter, Lithuania’s media elite are becoming European.4
The Europeanness of Lithuania’s media elite is manifested also from 
the perspective of the projective dimension. In this regard, the elite of 
mass media are also becoming European: this is especially evident on 
the geopolitical and political planes, though in view of economic pol-
icy this process is quite sluggish. Representatives of Lithuania’s media 
elite are increasingly unanimously supporting the EU’s foreign policy. 
Besides, they tend to assess the EU’s future in the medium-term and 
long-term in a very optimistic manner: most of them think that the EU 
will be stronger both politically and economically and that social and 
economic differences among the member states will be smaller 10 years 
later. In fact, it is evident that such optimistic view of the EU’s future is 
based on beliefs, hopes and desires, rather than on the cognitive assess-
ment and analysis of the actual situation.   
A more active affiliation of one’s self with Lithuania as well as with 
Europe, greater content with the EU governance and demonstrated 
support to further supranational decisions and processes, as well as op-
timistic evaluation of the EU’s future, are all unquestionably related to 
changes which took place in the period from 2008 to 2015 in Lithu-
ania, the EU and worldwide. Economic downturn, Russia’s aggression 
in Ukraine, the threat of terrorism and other challenges increase trust in 
4 Positive, i.e., high and sensitive consideration of the EU’s integrity, and negative, in 
other words, low and insensitive perception of the threat which is posed to Lithuania 
by its membership in the EU.
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supranational political organization. In the presence of an upheaval, the 
EU is perceived not only as a provider of financial support, but also as a 
certain guarantor of social security and geopolitical stability.
When thinking about the future of research on Europeanness, it 
would be worthwhile to draw attention to the attitude of other seg-
ments of Lithuania’s elite and the public opinion, to prepare a compara-
tive study, one that would highlight the discrepancy between the notion 
and the feeling and the related problems and which would presuppose 
that the EU is becoming an integral part of Lithuania’s political and cul-
tural agenda. Besides, what the study did not include within its analysis 
and what should become the focus of future studies is the compara-
tive research into the elite of the EU member states and their ordinary 
population, which would help identify how Lithuania’s elite and society 
are distinct in the EU context (if they are at all).
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